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For the supply of public goods， the traditional theory start from the property of 
the  product itself trying to find a solution to product supply methods. But this 
simple method gives an rather vague answer for  the mixed products. This thesis will 
analyze the product supply from the perspective of Incomplete Contract. 
They are flawed if Basic Education supply is given only by the government or 
market. Thus we should investigate how to combine the government and market. In 
this article we will discuss this combination in the terms of contracts. According to the 
theory of contracts，If the contract is complete， then the allocation of ownership does 
not affect the efficiency. However， the contract is not complete naturally and the 
configuration of property rights is very important. Education has its own 
characteristics. In particular， the benefits of education are difficult to measure， we 
should not only get a clear property rights， but also pay attention to outsourcing 
contract management，introduce completion and strengthen the regulations. 
This first part is literature review of different theories on the supply of Basic 
Education. In the second part ，we will propose theoretical analysis of the supply of 
Basic Education. This section extends the HSV model， join the variable x， make the 
model closer to reality and enhance the explanatory power. Privatization and credible 
regulation would be major tools for solution， the balance of cost and quality is also 
the focus. The third part gives a brief introduction of Basic Education in China， and 
make a comparative analysis of existing problems on the current public education and 
private education. Part V apply Incomplete Contract Theory to choose the supply 
model of Basic Education and raise contract management issues. The last part is 
conclusion part. 
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20 世纪 80 年代以来，现代企业理论产生了新的研究方法——不完全合同范
式。现实中的合同往往是是不完全的，即许多合同在关键因素上往往是含糊的或
沉默的（silent）(Tirole，1999)。合同的完全性可能来自以下三个交易成本（Tirole，
1999）：不可预见的或然情形（unforeseen contingencies）、签订合同的成本(cost of 
writing contracts)、法庭的执行成本(cost of enforcing contracts)。虽然人们早就认
识到合同的不完全性，但由于经济学还无法有效地将“有限理性”模型化，因而许
多文献往往仅将不完全合同作为描述性背景，然后在这一背景下探讨问题。这阻
止了不完全合同范式在正统经济学中的地位和应用。Grossman 和 Hart（1986） 



























和 Vishny(1997)利用 GHM 模型的基本方法研究政府供给范围问题；Besley 和
Ghatak（2001）利用 GHM 模型的基本方法研究政府与非政府组织合作问题；
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